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A key issue in current research and policy is the size of fiscal multipliers when the economy is in recession.
Using a variety of methods and data sources, we provide three insights. First, using regime-switching
models, we estimate effects of tax and spending policies that can vary over the business cycle; we
find large differences in the size of fiscal multipliers in recessions and expansions with fiscal policy
being considerably more effective in recessions than in expansions.  Second, we estimate multipliers
for more disaggregate spending variables which behave differently in relation to aggregate fiscal policy
shocks, with military spending having the largest multiplier.  Third, we show that controlling for predictable
components of fiscal shocks tends to increase the size of the multipliers.
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The impact of fiscal policy on output and its components has long been a central part of fiscal 
policy analysis.  But, as has been made clear by the recent debate over the likely effects and 
desired composition of fiscal stimulus in the United States and abroad, there remains an 
enormous range of views over the strength of fiscal policy’s macroeconomic effects, the 
channels through which these effects are transmitted, and the variations in these effects and 
channels with respect to economic conditions.  In particular, the central issue is the size of fiscal 
multipliers when the economy is in recession. 
Recent theoretical work by Christiano et al. (2009), Woodford (2010) and others 
emphasizes that government spending may have a large multiplier when the nominal interest rate 
is at the zero bound, which occurs only in recessions.  These novel theoretical findings for 
models where markets clear echo earlier Keynesian arguments that government spending is 
likely to have larger expansionary effects in recessions than in expansions.  Intuitively, when the 
economy has slack, expansionary government spending shocks are less likely to crowd out 
private consumption or investment.  To the extent discretionary fiscal policy is heavily used in 
recessions to stimulate aggregate demand, the key empirical question is how the effects of fiscal 
shocks vary over the business cycle.  The answer to this question is not only interesting to 
policymakers in designing  stabilization strategies but it can also help the economics profession 
to reconcile conflicting predictions about the effects of fiscal shocks across different types of 
macroeconomic models. 
Despite these important theoretical insights and strong demand by the policy process for 
estimates of fiscal multipliers, there is little, if any, empirical research trying to assess how the 
size of fiscal multiplies varies over the business cycle.  In part, this dearth of evidence reflects 2 
 
the fact that much of empirical research in this area is based on linear structural vector 
autoregressions (SVARs) or linearized dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models 
which by construction rule out state-dependent multipliers.
1  The limitations of these two 
approaches became evident during the recent policy debate in the United States, when 
government economists relied on neither of these approaches, but rather on more traditional 
large-scale macroeconometric models, to estimate the size and timing of U.S. fiscal policy 
interventions being undertaken then (e.g., Romer and Bernstein 2009, Congressional Budget 
Office 2009).  This reliance on a more traditional approach, in turn, led to criticisms based on 
conflicting predictions which used SVAR and DSGE approaches (e.g., Barro and Redlick, 2009, 
Cogan et al., 2009, Leeper et al., 2009). Thus, a main objective of this paper is to explore this 
gray area and to provide estimates of state-dependent fiscal multipliers.  
Our starting point is the classic paper by Blanchard and Perotti (2002), which estimated 
multipliers for government purchases and taxes on quarterly US data with the identifying 
assumptions that (1) discretionary policy does not respond to output within a quarter; (2) non-
discretionary policy responses to output are consistent with auxiliary estimates of fiscal output 
elasticities; (3) innovations in fiscal variables not predicted within the VAR constitute 
unexpected fiscal policy innovations; and (4) fiscal multipliers do not vary over the business 
cycle.  These multipliers are still commonly cited, although subsequent research has questioned 
whether the innovations in these SVARs really represent unanticipated changes in fiscal policy, 
                                                 
1 Alternative identification approaches, notably the narrative approach of Ramey and Shapiro (1998) and Romer and 
Romer (2010), rely instead on published information about the nature of fiscal changes.  But while the narrative 
approach offers a potentially more convincing method of identification, it imposes a severe constraint on its own, 
that the effects of only a very specific class of shocks can be evaluated (respectively, military spending build-ups 
and tax changes unrelated to short-term considerations such as recession or the need to balance spending changes).  
Furthermore, the narrative approach tends to provide qualitative assessments of the effects of fiscal policy shocks 
while policymakers are most interested in quantitative estimates of the effects.  Romer and Romer (2010) and 
Ramey (2009) are exceptions that provide quantitative estimates of fiscal multipliers.  3 
 
the challenge relating both to expectations and to whether the changes in fiscal variables 
represent actual changes in policy, rather than other changes in the relationship between fiscal 
variables and the included SVAR variables.  
Building on Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and the subsequent studies, our paper extends 
the existing literature in three ways.  First, using regime-switching SVAR models, we estimate 
effects of tax and spending policies that can vary over the business cycle.
2  We find large 
differences in the size of fiscal multipliers in recessions and expansions with fiscal policy being 
considerably more effective in recessions than in expansions.  Second, to measure the effects for 
a broader range of policies, we estimate multipliers for more disaggregate spending variables, 
which often behave quite differently in relation to aggregate fiscal policy shocks.  Third, we 
provide a more precise measure of unanticipated shocks to fiscal policy.  Specifically, we have 
collected and converted into electronic form the quarterly forecasts of fiscal and aggregate 
variables from the University of Michigan’s RSQE macroeconometric model.   We also use 
information from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) and the forecasts prepared by the 
staff of the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) for the meetings of the Federal Open Market 
Committee (FOMC).  We include these forecasts in the SVAR to purge fiscal variables of 
“innovations” that were predicted by professional forecasters.  We find that the forecasts help 
explain a considerable share of the fiscal innovations, and that controlling for this increases the 
size of estimated multipliers in recession. 
The next section of the paper lays out the basic specification of our regime-switching 
model.  Section 3 presents basic results for this model for aggregate spending and taxes.  Section 
                                                 
2 We prefer introducing regime switches in a SVAR rather than in a DSGE model since it is difficult to model slack 
in the economy and potentially non-clearing markets in a DSGE framework without imposing strong assumptions 
regarding the behavior of households and firms.  In contrast, SVAR models require fewer identifying assumptions 
and thus are tied more easily to empirical reality. 4 
 
4 provides results for individual components of spending and Section 5 develops and presents 
results for our method of controlling for expectations.  Section 6 concludes. 
2.  Econometric specification 
To allow for responses differentiated across recessions and expansions, we employ a regime 
switching vector autoregression where transitions across states (i.e., recession and expansion) are 
smooth.  Our estimation approach, which we will call STVAR, is similar to smooth transition 
autoregressive (STAR) models developed in Granger and Teravistra (1993).  One important 
difference between STAR and our STVAR, however, is that we allow not only differential 
dynamic responses but also differential contemporaneous responses to structural shocks.   
The key advantage of STVAR relative to estimating SVARs for each regime separately is 
that with the latter we may have relatively few observations in a particular regime – especially 
for recessions – which makes estimates unstable and imprecise.  In contrast, STVAR effectively 
utilizes more information by exploiting variation in the degree (which sometimes can be 
interpreted as the probability) of being in a particular regime so that estimation and inference for 
each regime is based on a larger set of observations.  Note that, to the extent we estimate 
properties of a given regime using in part dynamics of the system in another regime, we bias our 
estimates towards not finding differential fiscal multipliers across regimes.  
Our basic specification is: 
      1                                                           (1) 
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As in Blanchard and Perotti (2002), we estimate the equation using quarterly data and set 
                     in the basic specification where G is log real government (federal, state, and 
local) purchases (consumption and investment)
3, T is log real government receipts of direct and 
indirect taxes net of transfers to businesses and individuals, and Y is log real gross domestic 
product (GDP) in chained 2000 dollars.
4,5  This ordering of variables in Xt means that shocks in 
tax revenues and output have no contemporaneous effect on government spending.  As argued in 
Blanchard and Perotti (2002), this identifying minimum-delay assumption may be a sensible 
description of how government spending operates because in the short run government may be 
unable to adjust its spending in response to changes in fiscal and macroeconomic conditions.  
The model allows two ways for differences in the propagation of structural shocks: a) 
contemporaneous via differences in covariance matrices for disturbances Ω  and Ω ; b) dynamic 
via differences in lag polynomials       and      .
6  Variable z is an index (normalized to have 
unit variance so that   is scale invariant) of the business cycle, with positive z indicating an 
expansion.  Adopting the convention that   0 , we interpret Ω  and       as describing the 
behavior of the system in a (sufficiently) deep recession (i.e.,        1 )  and Ω  and       as 
describing the behavior of the system in a (sufficiently) strong expansion (i.e., 1        1 ). 
                                                 
3 We use the traditional approach of defining G to include direct consumption and investment purchases, which 
excludes the imputed rent on government capital stocks.  While the current U.S. method of constructing the national 
accounts now includes imputed rent, this was not the case for most of our sample period.  Although the historical 
national accounts have been revised to conform to the new approach, we cannot do this for our series of professional 
forecasts.  Therefore, we utilize the traditional method of measuring G in order to have series that are consistent over 
time. 
4 To compute G and T, we apply the GDP deflator to nominal counterparts of G and T.  We estimate the equations in 
log levels in order to preserve the cointegrating relationships among the variables.  An alternative but more complex 
approach would be to estimate the equations in differences and include error correction terms. 
5 We find similar results when we augment this VAR with variables capturing the stance of monetary policy.  
6 The number of lags is chosen by Akaike Information Criterion.  6 
 
We date the index z by t-1 to avoid contemporaneous feedbacks from policy actions into whether 
the economy is in a recession or an expansion.   
The choice of index z is not trivial because there is no clear-cut theoretical prescription 
for what this variable should be.  We set z equal to a seven-quarter moving average of the output 
growth rate.  The key advantages of using this measure of z are: i) we can use our full sample for 
estimation, which makes our estimates as precise and robust as possible; ii) we can easily 
consider dynamic feedbacks from policy changes to the state of the regime (i.e., we can 
incorporate the fact that policy shocks can alter the regime).
7   
Although it is possible, in principle, to estimate       ,      ,Ω  ,Ω    and   
simultaneously, identification of   relies on nonlinear moments and hence estimates may be 
sensitive to a handful of observations in short samples.  Granger and Teravistra (1993) suggest 
imposing fixed values of   and then using a grid search over   to ensure that estimates for 
      ,      ,Ω  ,Ω    are not sensitive to changes in  .  We calibrate   1 . 5  so that the 
economy spends about 20 percent of time in a recessionary regime (that is, Pr        0 . 8    
0.2) where we define an economy to be in a recession if        0 . 8 .
8  This calibration is 
consistent with the duration of recessions in the U.S. according to NBER business cycle dates 
(21 percent of the time since 1946).  Figure 1 compares the dynamics of       with recessions 
identified by the NBER.  
                                                 
7 We also considered, as an alternative, the Stock and Watson (1989) coincident index of the business cycle (now 
maintained by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and called Chicago Fed National Activity Index).  This series 
dates only to the mid-1960s and cannot be used for endogenous-regime multiplier calculations, but a potential 
benefit is that it incorporates more information than the growth rate of real GDP.  However, our alternative estimates 
using this index (not shown) suggest that the choice between the two definitions of z does not have a qualitatively 
important impact on our empirical results. 
8 When we estimate       ,      ,Ω  ,Ω    and   simultaneously, we find point estimates for   to be above 5 to 10 
depending on the definitions of variables and estimation sample.  These large parameter estimates suggest that the 
model is best described as a model switching regimes sharply at certain thresholds.  However, we prefer smooth 
transitions between regimes (which amounts to considering moderate values of  ) because in some samples we have 
only a handful of recessions and then parameter estimates for       ,      ,Ω  ,Ω    become very imprecise.  7 
 
Given the highly non-linear nature of the system described by equations (1)-(5), we use 
Monte Carlo Markov Chain methods developed in Chernozhukov and Hong (2003) for 
estimation and inference (see the Appendix for more details).  Under standard conditions, this 
approach finds a global optimum in terms of fit.  Furthermore, the parameter estimates as well as 
their standard errors can be computed directly from the generated chains. 
When we construct impulse responses to government spending shocks in a given regime, 
we initially ignore any feedback from changes in z into the dynamics of macroeconomic 
variables.
9  In other words, we assume that the system can stay for a long time in a regime.  The 
advantage of this approach is that, once a regime is fixed, the model is linear and hence impulse 
responses are not functions of history (see Koop et al. (1996) for more details).  However, we do 
consider later the effect of incorporating changes in z as part of the impulse response functions, 
recomputing z consistently with the predicted changes in output. 
Most of the impulse response functions and multipliers we present below are for changes 
in government purchases, G, and its components.  We will also present some results for changes 
in taxes, but we have several reasons for focusing on G.  First, much of the debate in the SVAR 
and DSGE literatures has been about the effects of government purchases.  Second, we are less 
confident of the SVAR framework as a tool for measuring the effects of tax policy, because (as 
discussed above) many of the unexpected changes in T may not arise as a result of a policy 
change, and because we would expect the effects of tax policy to work through the structure of 
taxation (e.g. marginal tax rates) rather than simply through the level of tax revenues.  Finally, 
our identification of tax shocks depends on our ability to purge innovations in revenues of 
automatic responses to output.  In attempting to do so, we follow Blanchard and Perotti (2002) in 
                                                 
9 Alternatively, one can interpret this approach as ordering z last in the VAR and setting all z to a fixed value.  8 
 
using auxiliary information on the elasticity of revenue with respect to output, but it is possible 
that this elasticity varies over the cycle, thereby introducing a bias of unknown magnitude and 
direction in our regime-specific estimates. 
3.  Basic Aggregate Results 
We begin by considering the effects of aggregate government purchases in the linear model with 
no regime shifts or control for expectations, following the basic specification of Blanchard and 
Perotti (2002), including the same ordering         for the Cholesky decomposition and the 
control for the automatic tax response to contemporaneous output shocks (an elasticity of 2.08).  
Our sample period is 1947:1—2009:2.  Figure 2 displays, in three panels, the resulting impulse 
response functions (IRFs) for a government purchase shock.  These multipliers demonstrate by 
how many dollars output, taxes, and government purchases increase over time when government 
purchases are increased by $1.
10  In this and all subsequent figures, the shaded bands around the 
impulse response functions are 90 percent confidence intervals.
11  Consistent with results 
reported in previous studies (see, for example, the survey by Hall, 2009), the maximum size of 
the government spending multiplier in the linear VAR model is about 1 and this maximum effect 
of a government spending shock on output is achieved after a short delay.  The response of future 
government purchases also peaks after a short delay, indicating that the typical government 
spending shock during the sample period is of relatively short duration.  Taxes fall slightly in 
response to the increase in government purchases.  This fall in taxes may contribute to the 
positive impact on output that persists even as the increase in government purchases dies off over 
time. 
                                                 
10 Because government purchases and output enter the estimated equations in logs, we scale the estimated IRFs by 
the sample average values of Y/G to convert percent changes into dollar changes. 
11 The Appendix discusses our method of estimating these confidence intervals. 9 
 
The next two figures plot the corresponding IRFs in expansions (Figure 3) and recessions 
(Figure 4).  Because of the smaller effective number of observations for each regime, particularly 
for recessions, the confidence bounds are greater for these IRFs than for those for the linear 
model in Figure 2.  Even with these wide bands, however, the responses in recession and 
expansion are quite different.  In both regimes, the impact output multiplier is about 0.5, slightly 
below that estimated for the linear model.  Over time, though, the IRFs diverge, with the 
response in expansions never rising higher and soon falling below zero, while the response in 
recessions rises steadily, reaching a value of over 2.5 after 20 quarters.  The strength of this 
output response in recession is not attributable simply to differences in the permanence of the 
spending shock or the tax response.  Taxes actually rise in recession, while falling in expansion.  
This difference, which is consistent with the automatic responses of tax collections to changes in 
output, should weaken the differences in the observed output responses in recession and 
expansion; and while the government spending shock is more persistent in recession, it is 
stronger in the short run in expansion.
12   
To put the magnitudes of these multipliers in perspective, consider multipliers in 
Keynesian models as well as the more recent DSGE literature.  Traditional Keynesian (IS-LM-
AS) models usually have large multipliers since the size of the multiplier is given by 1/ 1  
     where     is the marginal propensity to consume which is typically quite large (about 
0.5-0.9).
13  To the extent that the AS curve in the IS-LM-AS model is upward sloping, the 
multiplier can vary from relatively large (the AS curve is flat and there is a great deal of slack in 
                                                 
12 Note that the contemporaneous responses of output to a shock in government spending are similar in recessions 
and expansions.  This result suggests that the differences in the magnitudes of the multipliers across regimes are 
driven by the differences in the dynamics (i.e.,       ,       ) rather than in the covariance of error terms (i.e., 
 Ω ,Ω   ). 
13 For example, Shapiro and Slemrod (2003) and Johnson et al..(2006) report that the marginal propensity to 
consume out of (small) tax rebates in 2001 EGTRRA was somewhere between in 0.5 and 0.7.  10 
 
the economy; i.e., in a recession) to relatively small (the AS curve is steeply upward sloping and 
the economy operates at full capacity; i.e., in an expansion).  In contrast, an increase in 
government spending in modern business cycle models usually leads to a large crowding out of 
private consumption in recessions and expansions and correspondingly the typical magnitude for 
the multiplier is less than 0.5 (in many cases much smaller).  Recent findings from DSGE models 
with some Keynesian features (e.g., Christiano et al. 2009, Eggertsson 2008, and Woodford 
2010), however, suggest that the government spending multiplier in periods with a binding zero 
lower bound on nominal interest rates (which are recessionary times) could be somewhere 
between 3 and 5.  Intuitively, with the binding zero lower bound, increases in government 
spending have no effect on interest rates and thus there is no crowding out of investment or 
consumption, which leads to large multipliers.  
In short, our estimates of the government spending multiplier in recessions and 
expansions are largely consistent with the theoretical arguments in both (old) Keynesian and 
(new) modern business cycle models.  Table 1 summarizes these output multipliers for the cases 
just considered, as well as those that follow.  The table presents multipliers measured in two 
ways.  The first column gives the maximum impact on output (with standard errors in the second 
column) and the third column (with standard errors in the fourth column) shows the ratio of the 
sum of the Y response (to a shock in G) to the sum of G response (to a shock in G).  The first 
measure of the fiscal multiplier has been widely used since Blanchard and Perotti (2002).  The 
second measure has been advocated by Woodford (2010) and others since the size of the 
multiplier depends on the persistence of fiscal shocks.  Regardless of which way we compute the 
multiplier, it is much larger in recessions than in expansions.   11 
 
One might guess that the differences between our regime-based multipliers are 
exaggerated by our assumptions that the regimes themselves don’t change.  That is, if the 
multiplier is smaller in expansion than in recession and the economy has a positive probability of 
shifting from recession to expansion in future periods, then the actual multipliers starting in 
recession (or expansion) should be a blend of those estimated for the separate regimes.  
Calculating full dynamic impulse response functions that include internally consistent regime 
shifts is complicated, because we must compute the index z and evaluate the function F(z) at 
each date along the trajectory.  Also, because the IRFs are now nonlinear, they will depend on 
the initial value of the index z and the size of the government policy shock.  For example, the 
more deep the initial recession, and the less positive the spending shock, the less important future 
regime shifts out of recession will be.  Therefore, we must specify the initial conditions and the 
size of the policy experiment in order to estimate the dynamic IRFs. 
Figure 5 presents estimates for the historical effects of shocks to government purchases 
on output, incorporating regime shifts in response to government spending shocks.  For each 
period, we consider a policy shock equal to one percent increase in G and report a dollar increase 
in output per dollar increase in government spending over 20 quarters (i.e., ∑   
      /∑   
     ).  
The size of the multiplier varies considerably over the business cycle.  For example in 1985, an 
increase in government spending would have barely increased output. In contrast, a dollar 
increase in government spending in 2009 could raise output by about $1.75. Typically, the 
multiplier is between 0 and 0.5 in expansions and between 1 and 1.5 in recessions.  Note the size 
of the multiplier tends to change relatively quickly as the economy starts to grow after reaching a 
trough.  Thus, the timing of changes in discretionary government spending is critical for 
effectiveness of countercyclical fiscal policies.  12 
 
Bearing in mind caveats we have discussed above, we turn now to the effects of taxes on 
output.  Figures 6-8 are comparable to Figures 2-4 for government purchases, with Figures 6-8 
showing the IRFs for output, spending and taxes in response to a tax increase for each of the 
three regimes, with confidence bands.  As with government purchases, the results for taxes in the 
linear model are consistent with the past results in the SVAR literature.  From an initial impact of 
-0.2, the effect on output grows in strength over time, reaching -1.0 by the end of five years, 
which is similar to results reported in Blanchard and Perotti (2002).
14  In contrast to the case of 
spending shocks, however, the IRFs for the expansion and recession regimes do not bracket 
those for the linear case.  In both regimes, the output effects are less negative.  They are, in fact, 
generally positive in the recession regime.  However, this response is sensitive to using 
alternative measures of the elasticity of tax revenue with respect to output and one can obtain 
negative responses of Y to a shock in T if the elasticity in recessions is larger than the elasticity 
estimated in Blanchard and Perotti (2002). 
The results for the expansion regime may be understood by observing that the responses 
of government purchases to a tax increase are much more positive in expansions than in the 
linear model.  This increase in G is what can cause a less negative impact on output in 
expansions.  In recessions, the output response is more puzzling; subsequent tax increases are 
stronger and government spending increases weaker, at least initially, than in expansions, and yet 
the output effects of an initial tax increase are positive.  Presumably, the stronger subsequent tax 
increases reflect, at least in part, the automatic responses of tax collections to higher output.  But 
                                                 
14 Romer and Romer (2010) report larger multipliers (-3) for changes in tax revenue. After a series of 
methodological refinements (e.g., use changes in tax receipts rather than tax liabilities, formal statistical criteria to 
choose the length of lag polynomials, more precise timing of the shocks) and using the same approach, Perotti 
(2010) finds multipliers to be approximately -1.5.  13 
 
the overall pattern still suggests that the underlying effect on output of the initial tax increase is 
quite positive, a result for which we can offer no obvious explanation. 
4.  Results for Components of Spending 
Just as output multipliers for government purchases differ according to the regime in which they 
occur, they also differ for different components of government purchases.  As discussed earlier, 
studies using the narrative approach tend to focus on military build-ups, but how useful are these 
shocks to defense spending in analyzing the effects of other changes in spending policies, such as 
those adopted during the recent recession?  
Figure 9 shows that IRFs for output in response to defense and non-defense spending 
shocks, based on a four-variable VAR including defense and non-defense purchases, as well as 
output and taxes.  We order the Cholesky decomposition with defense spending first and non-
defense spending second, although this does not have an important effect on the results.
15  
Clearly, the IRFs have different shapes for the linear model.  For a unit shock to defense 
spending, output rises immediately by just over 1, which is consistent with Ramey (2009), and 
then gradually falls, becoming negative after several quarters.  For non-defense spending, the 
output effect starts smaller but eventually exceeds 1 and remains above 0.6 for the entire period 
shown.  Once the results are broken down by regime, however, we can see a much stronger 
dependence on the regime of the defense spending IRFs, which are similar to the linear-model 
results for the case of expansion but much more positive in recession, peaking at nearly 4 in the 
fifth quarter after the shock.  For non-defense spending, on the other hand, the differences 
                                                 
15 Further details regarding confidence intervals and the effects on taxes and spending components are provided in 
the Appendix in Figures A1-A6. 14 
 
between regimes are primarily with respect to timing rather than size, with the most positive 
responses occurring rapidly in expansions but with several quarters’ delay in recessions. 
  Figure 10 shows the results of an experiment that breaks government purchases down in a 
different way, into consumption and investment spending, with consumption ordered first.
16  
Once again, the results differ considerably by regime and by spending component.  In this 
decomposition, both components of spending have positive effects on output in the linear model, 
although the effects of investment spending are much stronger, particularly during the first few 
quarters when the impact on output exceeds 2 for investment but is around 0.5 for consumption.  
Estimating the IRFs separately for recession and expansion leads in general to the expected result 
of more positive multipliers in recession than in expansion.  The IRFs are also noisier for the 
separate regimes, indicating an imprecision of these point estimates that is consistent with the 
larger confidence intervals (see Appendix figures). 
5.  Controlling for Expectations 
As emphasized by Ramey (2009) and others, the timing of fiscal shocks plays a critical role in 
identifying the effect of fiscal shocks. In spirit of Ramey (2009), we control for expectations not 
already absorbed by the VAR using real-time professional forecasts from three sources.  First, 
we draw forecasts for output and government spending variables from the Survey of Professional 
Forecasters (SPF), an average of forecasts (with the number of individual forecasters ranging 
from 9 to 50) available since 1968 for GDP and since 1982 for government spending and its 
components.  Second, for government revenues, we use the University of Michigan RSQE 
                                                 
16 Appendix Figures A7-A12 provide further details of this experiment. 15 
 
econometric model, for which forecasts are available for the period beginning in 1982.
17  Third, 
we use government spending (Greenbook) forecasts prepared by the FRB staff for FOMC 
meetings.  The Greenbook forecasts for government spending are available from 1966 to 2004. 
Since the FOMC meets 8 or 12 times a year in our sample, we take Greenbook forecasts 
prepared for the meeting which is the closest to the middle of the quarter to make it comparable 
to SPF forecasts.  Since the properties of the Greenbook and SPF forecasts are similar, we splice 
the Greenbook and SPF government spending forecasts and construct a continuous forecast 
series running from 1966 to present.  For each variable, we use the forecast made in period t-1 
for the period-t value.  Because there have been numerous data revisions in the National Income 
and Product Accounts since the dates of these forecasts, we use forecast growth rates rather than 
levels.  
The importance of controlling for expectations is illustrated in Figure 11, which plots the 
residuals from projecting forecasted and actual growth rates of government spending on lags of 
the variables in our baseline VAR.
18  If the VAR innovations were truly unexpected, then these 
two residuals would be unrelated, but the correlation between forecasted and actual growth rates 
of government spending (net of the information contained in the VAR lags) is about 0.3-0.4 
which points to conclusion that a sizable fraction of VAR innovations is predictable.  Therefore, 
one should be interested in using refined measures of unanticipated shocks to government 
spending.  
  The simplest way to account for these forecastable components of VAR residuals is to 
expand the vector X to include professional forecasts.  That is, if we let the 
                                                 
17 The University of Michigan data are coded from hard copies.  Hard copies of forecasts prior to 1982 were lost that 
year in the fire that destroyed that university’s Economics Department building. 
18 The figure presents two versions of this plot, with similar results, one relating forecast residuals to VAR residuals 
based on real-time data, the other to VAR residuals based on final-vintage data. 16 
 
SPF/Greenbook/RSQE forecasts made at time t-1 for the growth rate of real government 
purchases for time t be denoted ∆  |   
   (where ∆  | 
   is the growth rate of government spending 
G at time s forecasted at time t) and define the professional forecasts for output and taxes the 
same way, we would use the expanded vector in equation (1)  ∆  |   
   ∆  |   
   ∆   |   
                , 
stacking the forecasts first because by the timing there is no contemporaneous feedback from 
unanticipated shocks at time t to forecasts made at time t-1.
19  This direct approach is attractive 
because it accounts automatically for any effects that expectations might have on the aggregate 
variables and for the determinants of the expectations themselves.  In practice, however, we have 
found this approach to be too demanding given our data limitations, for it doubles the number of 
variables in the VAR while eliminating more than half of the observations in our sample (i.e., 
those before 1982); the resulting confidence intervals are very large, particularly for the 
recession regime for which we have effectively fewer observations.
20,21 
We consider two alternative approaches.  The first alternative is a two-step process.  The 
first step of this process is to create “true” innovations by subtracting forecasts of the vector Xt 
from Xt itself.  We then fit  Ω   Ω   1            Ω          (i.e., equation (3)) using these 
forecast errors (rather than the residuals from the VAR itself).  From this step, we use estimated 
Ω  and Ω  to construct contemporaneous responses to shocks in expansions and recessions.  The 
second step involves using the previously-estimated baseline VAR with regime switches.  In this 
step, we use the estimated coefficients Π     and Π     to map the propagation of 
                                                 
19 See Leduc et al. (2007) for a more detailed discussion on the ordering. 
20 We do consider a more restricted version of this approach shortly, in which we add a series on defense spending 
innovations available for our full sample directly to the VAR. 
21 Mertens and Ravn (2010) distinguish anticipated and unanticipated shocks in a VAR by using long-run 
restrictions combined with calibration.  We do not use this strategy in part because with regime switches we cannot 
distinguish long-run responses in expansions and recessions.  17 
 
contemporaneous responses created in the first step.  This two-step approach has the advantage 
of allowing us to base the VAR on our full sample and the original number of variables.  Its main 
disadvantage is that the IRF dynamics will not necessarily be correct, given that the VAR is 
estimated under the assumption that the innovations to X are fully unanticipated. 
The second alternative approach is to augment the baseline VAR directly, but with only 
one variable, pertaining to the forecast of government spending.  For example, the vector of 
variables in the VAR could be          ∆    |   
                 or              
                where    
  is 
the forecast error for the growth rate of government spending or some other measure of news 
about government spending.  In the former specification, an innovation in    orthogonal to 
∆  |   
   is interpreted as an unanticipated shock.  In the latter specification, an innovation in the 
forecast error or news about government spending is interpreted as an unanticipated shock.  The 
key advantage of this approach is that, with sufficiently long series, we can have a VAR of a 
manageable size and yet we can remove directly a predictable component from government 
spending innovations.   
With these alternative approaches and specifications, unanticipated shocks to government 
spending of a given initial size will lead to differing government spending responses over time. 
To make IRFs comparable, we normalize the size of the unanticipated government spending 
shock so that the integral of a government spending response over 20 quarters is equal to one.  
Therefore the interpretation of the fiscal multipliers is similar to the second column in Table 1. 
Figure 12 shows the IRFs for different approaches and specifications and contrasts these results 
with the results for the baseline specification (1)-(5) that does not control for the predictable 
component in government spending innovations.  Table 1 reports the maximum and average 
multipliers along with associated standard errors.  18 
 
Panel A (Figure 12) presents IRFs for the first approach.  The results suggest that 
controlling for expectations increases the absolute magnitudes of the government spending 
multipliers, making them more positive in recessions and more negative in expansions.  Panel B 
(Figure 12)  shows results for the second approach with         ∆    |   
                 where ∆  |   
   
is the spliced Greenbook/SPF forecast series for the growth rate of government spending.  In this 
specification, which is estimated on the 1966-2009 sample, the multiplier in the recession regime 
is a notch larger than in the baseline model while the multiplier in the expansion regime stays 
positive but small which contrasts with the baseline model where the multiplier turns negative at 
long horizons.  Panel C (Figure 12) shows results for the second approach  with       
    
                where    
   is the forecast error computed as the difference between spliced 
Greenbook/SPF forecast series and actual, first-release series of the government spending growth 
rate.
22  In this specification, an unanticipated shock to government spending in an expansion has 
an effect on output similar to the effect we find in the baseline model. In a recession, however, 
the multiplier could be larger than in the baseline model, especially at short horizons.  By and 
large, these results suggest that the government spending multiplier in recessions increases and 
the multiplier in expansions does stay close to zero when we purify government spending shocks 
from predictable movements.  
Finally, we use spending news constructed in Ramey (2009) to control for the timing of 
fiscal shocks (Panel D, Figure 12).  Specifically, we augment the baseline VAR with Ramey’s 
spending news series, which is ordered first in this new VAR.  The key advantage of using 
Ramey’s series is that, in contrast to forecast series, it covers the whole post-WWII sample and 
thus our estimates are more precise.  A limitation of Ramey’s unanticipated shocks is that these 
                                                 
22 An advantage of using real-time data to compute forecast errors is that it makes forecasts and actual series refer to 
the same concept of government spending.   19 
 
shocks refer only to military spending.  However, since changes in military spending account for 
a large share of variation in total government spending, Ramey’s shocks are informative for our 
analysis.  Panel D shows that although controlling for spending news does not materially affect 
output responses during expansions, there are some important differences during recessions.  In 
particular, the multiplier on impact is about 2 in response to an unanticipated shock and the 
average multiplier over 20 quarters is 3.7.  In contrast, the baseline VAR specification reports the 
impact multiplier of 0.8 and the average multiplier of 2.2.  We view these findings as 
corroborating our other evidence on the importance of constructing unanticipated fiscal shocks, 
which tend to have larger effects on output in recessions.  
6.  Concluding remarks 
Our findings suggest that all of the extensions we developed in this paper – controlling for 
expectations, allowing responses to vary in recession and expansion, and allowing for different 
multipliers for different components of government purchases – all have important effects on the 
resulting estimates.  In particular, policies that increase government purchases have a much 
larger impact in recession than is implied by the standard linear model, even more so when one 
controls for expectations, which is clearly called for given the extent to which independent 
forecasts help predict VAR policy “shocks.” 
While we have extended the SVAR approach, our analysis still shares some of the 
limitations of the previous literature.  We have allowed for different economic environments, but 
there may be still other important differences among historical episodes that we lump together, 
for example recessions, such as the recent one, associated with financial market disruptions and 
very low nominal government interest rates, and other recessions induced by monetary 
contractions (such as the one in the early 1980s).  Our predictions are also tied to historical 20 
 
experience concerning the persistence of policy shocks, and therefore may not apply to policies 
either less or more permanent.  The effects of taxes, even if purged of expected changes, are still 
probably too simple as they fail to take account of the complex ways in which structural tax 
policy changes can influence the economy.  And, finally, as we enter a period of unprecedented 
long-run budget stress, the U.S. postwar experience, or even the experience of other countries 
that have dealt with more acute budget stress
23, may not provide very accurate forecasts of future 
responses.  
These limitations of our analysis should motivate future theoretical work to develop 
realistic DSGE models with potentially nonlinear features to understand more deeply the forces 
driving differences in the size of fiscal multipliers over the business cycle, the role of 
(un)anticipated shocks for fiscal multipliers in these environments, and implications of levels of 
government debt for the potency of discretionary fiscal policy to stabilize the economy. 
                                                 
23 See, for example, Perotti (1999) and Ardagna (2004). 21 
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Appendix: Estimation procedure 
The model is estimated using maximum likelihood methods. The log-likelihood for model (1)-
(5) is given by: 
               
 
 ∑    | |    
   
 
 ∑   
  
    
 
     (A1) 
where            1   –                                      .
24  Since the model is highly 
nonlinear and has many parameters Ψ     ,Ω  ,Ω  ,Π     ,Π     , using standard optimization 
routines is problematic and, thus, we employ the following procedure.  
Note that conditional on   ,Ω ,Ω     the model is linear in lag polynomials 
 Π    ,Π     .  Thus, for a given guess of   ,Ω ,Ω   , we can estimate  Π    ,Π      with 
weighted least squares where weights are given by  
   and estimates of  Π    ,Π      must 
minimize 
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    .  Let  
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be the extended vector of regressors and Π   Π    Π   so that         –   
  and the objective 
function is  
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     (A2) 
Note that we can rewrite (A2) as 
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The first order condition with respect to  is ∑    
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Now using the vec operator, we get 
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     
   . (A3) 
The procedure iterates on   ,Ω ,Ω    (which yields  and the likelihood) until an optimum is 
reached.  Note that with a homoscedastic error term (i.e. Ω             ), we recover standard VAR 
estimates.  
                                                 
24 To simplify notation, we omit other controls in equation (1).  24 
 
Since the model is highly non-linear in parameters, it is possible to have several local 
optima and one must try different starting values for   ,Ω ,Ω   .  To ensure that Ω  and Ω  are 
positive definite, we use Ψ     ,          Ω   ,     Ω  ,Π    ,Π     , where chol is the operator 
for Cholesky decomposition.   Furthermore, given the non-linearity of the problem, it may be 
difficult to construct confidence intervals for parameter estimates as well as impulse responses.  
To address these issues, we use a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method developed in 
Chernozhukov and Hong (2003; henceforth CH).  This method delivers not only a global 
optimum but also distributions of parameter estimates.  
We employ the Hastings-Metropolis algorithm to implement CH’s estimation method. 
Specifically our procedure to construct chains of length N can be summarized as follows:  
Step 1: Draw 





(n) is the current n state of the vector of parameter values in the 
chain, 
(n) is a vector of i.i.d. shocks taken from N(0,), and  is a diagonal matrix.  
Step 2: Take the n+1 state of the chain as 
Ψ         Θ    with probability min 1,exp   Θ        Ψ       
Ψ    otherwise                                                                      
 
where L(
(n)) is the value of the objective function at the current state of the chain and 
L(
(n))  is the value of the objective function using the candidate vector of parameter 
values.  
The starting value 
(0) is computed as follows.  We approximate the model in (1)-(5) so that the 
model can be written as regressing    on lags of   ,     ,     
 .  We take the residual from this 
regression and fit equation (3) using MLE to estimate Ω  and Ω .  These estimates are used as 
staring values.  Given Ω  and Ω  and the fact that the model is linear conditional on Ω  and Ω , 
we construct starting values for  lag polynomials  Π    ,Π      using equation (A3).  
The initial  is calibrated to about one percent of the parameter value and then adjusted 
on the fly for the first 20,000 draws to generate 0.3 acceptance rates of candidate draws, as 
proposed in Gelman et al (2004).  We use 100,000 draws for our baseline and robustness 
estimates, and drop the first 20,000 draws (“burn-in” period).  We run a series of diagnostics to 
check the properties of the resulting distributions from the generated chains.  We find that the 
simulated chains converge to stationary distributions and that simulated parameter values are 
consistent with good identification of parameters.  25 
 
CH show that Ψ    
 
 ∑ Ψ     
     is a consistent estimate of  under standard regularity 
assumptions of maximum likelihood estimators.  CH also prove that the covariance matrix of the 
estimate of   is given by   
 
 ∑  Ψ      Ψ   
   
     v a r   Ψ     , that is the variance of the 
estimates in the generated chain.   
Furthermore, we can use the generated chain of parameter values  Ψ    
   
 
 to construct 
confidence intervals for the impulse responses.  Specifically, we make 1,000 draws (with 
replacement) from  Ψ    
   
 
 and for each draw we calculate an impulse response.  Since 
columns of      Ω   and      Ω    in  Ψ    
   
 
 are identified up to sign, the generated chains 
for      Ω   and      Ω   can change signs.  Although this change of signs is not a problem 
for estimation, it can sometimes pose a problem for the analysis of impulse responses.  In 
particular, when there is a change of signs for the entries of      Ω   and      Ω   that 
correspond to the variance of government spending shocks, these entries can be very close to 
zero.  Given that we compute responses to a unit shock in government spending and thus have to 
divide entries of  chol(R) and chol(E)  that correspond to the government spending shock by 
the standard deviation of the government spending shock, confidence bands may be too wide.  
To address this numerical issue, when constructing impulse responses, we draw  Π    ,Π       
directly from  Ψ    
   
 
 while the covariance matrix of residuals in regime s is drawn from  
  vec Ω  ,Σ    where  Σ   2     
          var vec Ω      var vec Ω        
           , 
Dn is the duplication matrix, and var vec Ω    is computed from  Ψ    
   
 
 (see Hamilton 
(1994) for more details).  The 90 percent confidence bands are computed as the 5
th and 95
th 
percentiles of the generated impulse responses.   
 
 
Table 1: Multipliers 
max   ,…,           ∑   
      /∑   









Total spending   
Linear  1.00 0.32   0.57  0.25
Expansion  0.57 0.12   -0.33  0.20
Recession  2.48 0.28   2.24  0.24
Total taxes
*   
Linear  -0.99 0.10   -6.71  0.11
Expansion  -0.50 0.10   -2.03  0.11
Recession  -0.08 0.12   0.30  0.10
Defense spending   
Linear  1.16 0.52   -0.21  0.27
Expansion  0.80 0.22   -0.43  0.24
Recession  3.56 0.74   1.67  0.72
Non-defense spending   
Linear  1.17 0.19   1.58  0.18
Expansion  1.26 0.14   1.03  0.15
Recession  1.12 0.27   1.09  0.31
Consumption spending  
Linear  1.21 0.27   1.20  0.31
Expansion  0.17 0.13   -0.25  0.10
Recession  2.11 0.54   1.47  0.31
Investment spending   
Linear  2.12 0.68   2.39  0.67
Expansion  3.02 0.25   2.27  0.15
Recession  2.85 0.36   3.42  0.38
Total spending; multipliers for alternative measures of normalized unanticipated shocks to 
government spending 
Baseline model, normalized shocks to government   
Expansion  0.63 0.13   -0.33  0.20
Recession  3.06 0.35   2.24  0.24
SPF/RSQE forecast errors as contemporaneous shocks (Panel A in Figure 12) 
Expansion  1.13 0.20   -1.23  0.65
Recession  3.85 0.29   2.99  0.27
Control for SPF/Greenbook forecast of government spending (Panel B in Figure 12) 
Expansion  0.82 0.12   0.40  0.15
Recession  3.27 0.73   2.58  0.59
Real-time SPF/Greenbook forecast error for G as an unanticipated shock (Panel C in Figure 12)
Expansion  0.46 0.27   -0.25  0.23
Recession  7.14 1.45   2.09  1.35
Ramey (2009) news shocks (Panel D in Figure 12)  
Expansion  0.66 0.12   -0.49  0.24
Recession  4.88 0.67   3.76  0.52
* Note: the first column for total taxes is the minimal response to a positive shock in taxes.   
 
 
Figure 1. NBER dates and weight on recession regime F(z) 
 
Notes: The shaded region shows recessions as defined by the NBER. The solid black line shows 
the weight on recession regime F(z).  
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Figure 2. Impulse responses in the linear model 
 
Notes: The figures show impulse responses to a $1 increase in government spending.  Shaded 
region is the 90% confidence interval. Dashed lines show the responses in expansionary (red, 
long dash) and recessionary (blue, short dash) regimes. Solid line with circles shows the response 
in the linear model.  
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Figure 3. Impulse responses in expansions 
 
Notes: The figures show impulse responses to a $1 increase in government spending.  Shaded 
region is the 90% confidence interval. Dashed lines show the responses in expansionary (red, 
long dash) and recessionary (blue, short dash) regimes. Solid line with circles shows the response 
in the linear model.   
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Figure 4. Impulse responses in recessions 
 
Notes: The figures show impulse responses to a $1 increase in government spending.  Shaded 
region is the 90% confidence interval. Dashed lines show the responses in expansionary (red, 
long dash) and recessionary (blue, short dash) regimes. Solid line with circles shows the response 
in the linear model. 
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Figure 5. Historical multiplier for total government spending 
 
Notes: shaded regions are recessions defined by the NBER. The solid black line is the cumulative multiplier computed as ∑   
      /∑   
     , 
where time index h is in quarters. Blue dashed lines are 90% confidence interval. The multiplier incorporates the feedback from G shock to 
the business cycle indicator z. In each instance, the shock is one percent increase in government spending. 












Figure 6. Impulse responses in the linear model: tax shocks 
 
Notes: The figures show impulse responses to a $1 increase in taxes.  Shaded region is the 90% 
confidence interval. Dashed lines show the responses in expansionary (red, long dash) and 
recessionary (blue, short dash) regimes. Solid line with circles shows the response in the linear 
model.  
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Figure 7. Impulse responses in expansions: tax shocks 
 
Notes: The figures show impulse responses to a $1 increase in taxes.  Shaded region is the 90% 
confidence interval. Dashed lines show the responses in expansionary (red, long dash) and 
recessionary (blue, short dash) regimes. Solid line with circles shows the response in the linear 
model.  
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Figure 8. Impulse responses in recessions: tax shocks 
 
Notes: The figures show impulse responses to a $1 increase in taxes.  Shaded region is the 90% 
confidence interval. Dashed lines show the responses in expansionary (red, long dash) and 
recessionary (blue, short dash) regimes. Solid line with circles shows the response in the linear 
model.  
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Figure 9. Defense and nondefense government spending 
 
Notes: The figures show impulse responses to a $1 increase in government spending: defense 
spending in the top panel and non-defense spending in the bottom panel. Dashed lines show the 
responses in expansionary (red, long dash) and recessionary (blue, short dash) regimes. Solid line 
with circles shows the response in the linear model.  


































Figure 10. Consumption and investment government spending  
 
Notes: The figures show impulse responses to a $1 increase in government spending: 
consumption spending in the top panel and investment spending in the bottom panel. Dashed 
lines show the responses in expansionary (red, long dash) and recessionary (blue, short dash) 
regimes. Solid line with circles shows the response in the linear model. 


































Figure 11. Forecastability of VAR shocks to government spending 
 
Notes: The figure plots residuals from projections of the growth rate of government spending 
predicted in SPF/Greenbook [horizontal axis] and actual growth rate of government spending 
(final vintage of data = top panel;  real-time/first-release data = bottom panel) [vertical axis] on 
the information contained in the lags of the our baseline VAR. corr stands for the correlation 
between series. b and se show the estimated slope and associated standard error from regressing 
the residual for the actual growth rate of government spending on the residual for the predicted 










































































































































Growth rate of G (SPF/GB) orthogonal info in VAR lags 
 
 
Figure 12. Government spending multipliers for purified unanticipated shocks.  
Panel A: Contemporaneous responses based on forecast errors from SPF/RSQE 
 
Panel B: Purify innovations in government spending using SPF/Greenbook forecasts 
  
Panel C: Interpret forecast errors (real time data) of SPF/Greenbook forecasts for the growth rate of  
government spending as unanticipated shocks to government spending  
   
(continued on next page) 
  














Contemp. responses using SPF/RSQE forec errors
Baseline























Control for GB/SPF forecasts
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SPF/GB forecast errors as G shocks
Baseline












Panel D: Government spending innovations are Ramey (2009) news shocks to military spending.  
    
Notes: Note: The figure plots impulse response of output to an unanticipated government 
spending shock which is normalized to have the sum of government spending over 20 quarters 
equal to one.  The red lines with circles correspond to the responses in the baseline VAR 
specification. The shaded region is the 90% confidence interval. 
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Figure A1. Defense spending: linear model 
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Figure A2. Non-defense spending: linear model 
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Figure A3. Defense spending: Recession 
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Figure A4. Non-defense spending: recessions 
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Figure A5. Defense spending: expansions 
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Figure A6. Non-defense spending: expansion 
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Figure A7. Consumption spending: linear model 
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Figure A8. Investment spending: linear model 
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Figure A9. Consumption spending: recessions 
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Figure A10. Investment spending: recessions 
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G (investment) shock => Y response 
 
 
Figure A11. Consumption spending: expansions 
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Figure A12. Investment spending: expansions 
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G (investment) shock => Y response